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ESSAY 
THE INTERACTION OF EXHAUSTION AND THE GENERAL 
LAW: A REPLY TO DUFFY AND HYNES 
Ariel Katz, Aaron Perzanowski, and Guy A. Rub* 
INTRODUCTION 
N Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Proper-
ty,1 Professors John Duffy and Richard Hynes argue that exhaustion—
the doctrine that limits a patentee’s or copyright holder’s control over 
goods in the stream of commerce—was created and functions to confine 
Intellectual Property (“IP”) law within its own domain and prevent it 
from displacing other laws. Exhaustion, in their description, sets aside a 
space that other areas of the law, such as contracts and property, are left 
to regulate. 
Like Duffy and Hynes, we believe that the intersection of IP and 
commercial law is an important topic with serious ramifications that 
would benefit from more scholarly attention, so we welcome their con-
tribution to the ongoing debate over exhaustion. It is a debate in which 
the three of us have been deeply engaged, and one in which we rarely 
 
* Ariel Katz is an Associate Professor, Innovation Chair–Electronic Commerce, Faculty of 
Law, University of Toronto. Aaron Perzanowski is an Associate Professor, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. Guy A. Rub is an Associate Professor, Michael E. Moritz 
College of Law, The Ohio State University. We would like to thank John Rothchild, Molly 
Van Houweling, and Chris Walker for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are, of 
course, our own. 
1 John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellec-
tual Property, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2016).  
I
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find ourselves entirely aligned.2 However, when it comes to many of 
Duffy and Hynes’s fundamental insights about the relationship between 
IP and other areas of law, we not only agree with each other, we also 
agree with them. And we suspect most scholars engaged in the exhaus-
tion debate would as well. Like Duffy and Hynes, the scholarly consen-
sus acknowledges that other areas of law—most notably contracts—
have a role to play in structuring transactions even when exhaustion lim-
its copyright and patent exclusivity. IP law does not and should not exist 
in a vacuum. It must take into account the rights and obligations estab-
lished under other bodies of law. 
So far so good. But Duffy and Hynes make broader claims about the 
origins of exhaustion and its relationship to other bodies of law. That is 
where we part ways. They argue that the desire to confine IP law within 
its own domain and prevent it from displacing other laws is the exclusive 
explanation for both the emergence of exhaustion and its current func-
tion. In doing so they reject the idea that courts developed exhaustion in 
light of long-standing common law principles. Acknowledging the 
common law origins of the doctrine, they suggest, requires courts to 
wield exhaustion as a bludgeon, pummeling any commercial law doc-
trine that stands in its way. 
In this Essay, we explain why we are not persuaded. We first discuss 
the role of the common law in shaping the exhaustion doctrine. We 
show that the evidence Duffy and Hynes offer is inconclusive, incom-
plete, and at times inaccurate. Close examination of early exhaustion 
cases paints a more complex picture that cannot be squared with the idea 
that exhaustion was created independently of common law principles. 
Next, we explain how Duffy and Hynes mischaracterize the prevailing 
scholarly understanding of exhaustion and how the approach they advo-
cate would strip exhaustion of any normative content. While we agree 
that exhaustion draws a line between the domain of IP law and other 
laws and thus prevents the former from displacing the latter, the place-
ment of that line is far from arbitrary, and has always reflected policy 
considerations. Finally, we note that Duffy and Hynes’s theory oversim-
plifies the relationship between IP law and state law, partly because it 
does not fully consider federal preemption. 
 
2 See, e.g., Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 
2014 BYU L. Rev. 55, 55, 59–60 (2014); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Ex-
haustion, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 889, 892 (2011); Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaus-
tion, 64 Emory L.J. 741, 743–44 (2015). 
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I. THE COMMON LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF EXHAUSTION 
Did the common law play a role in the emergence of exhaustion? 
Duffy and Hynes vigorously argue it did not. But in reaching that con-
clusion, they largely ignore a line of early exhaustion decisions that in-
voke common law principles. And they struggle to square their approach 
with the Supreme Court’s most recent copyright exhaustion decision—in 
their own words, “one of the most important decisions on the commer-
cial law of [intellectual property]”3—that described exhaustion as “a 
common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree.”4 
Duffy and Hynes insist the common law played no part in the creation 
of exhaustion; the doctrine is a matter of statutory interpretation and 
nothing else. Our claim is modest by comparison. We argue that the 
common law did play an important role. But unlike Duffy and Hynes, 
we don’t see the common law and statutory interpretation as incompati-
ble. Courts are not forced to either faithfully interpret statutes, or alter-
natively exercise “a free ranging power to create federal common law.”5 
We instead argue that courts rely on existing common law principles in 
choosing between competing statutory interpretations. Framing the al-
ternative as a power to fabricate federal common law conjures up an ac-
tivist bogeyman when in fact, the courts that developed the principle of 
exhaustion followed a well-trodden judicial path of erring on the side of 
the common law. 
As Duffy and Hynes point out, statutory interpretation is not confined 
to the text alone.6 Courts must look to—among a range of sources—
other bodies of existing law. This is especially true when a statute is en-
acted against an existing body of common law. When Congress legis-
lates in an area “previously governed by the common law,” courts must 
start from the assumption “that Congress intended to retain the substance 
of the common law.”7 Where the courts have already spoken, “Congress 
does not write upon a clean slate.”8 If Congress wants to depart from 
common law principles, the statute “must ‘speak directly’ to the ques-
 
3 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 41. 
4 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).  
5 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 28. 
6 Id.  
7 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 n.13 (2010); see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Part-
nership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–46 (2011); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 
(1952). 
8 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
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tion.”9 That canon of construction is as old as Congress itself10 and is 
still accepted today.11 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus demonstrates this point.12 There the Su-
preme Court had to decide whether the copyright owner’s right to 
“vend” gave it control over just the first authorized sale or extended to 
subsequent sales too. The Court limited the right to “vend” to the first 
sale.13 Many scholars and subsequent courts explain that choice as at 
least partly motivated by common law principles—in particular those 
favoring the free alienability of personal property and reflecting skepti-
cism of servitudes on chattels.14 We agree with Duffy and Hynes that the 
text of the opinion does not compel that reading; the Court did not ex-
plicitly invoke the common law. But neither did it explain exhaustion as 
a bulwark against copyright law encroaching upon the “commercial law 
generally,” as Duffy and Hynes argue.15 
As such, Bobbs-Merrill does not contradict the consensus view that 
centuries-old common law principles played an important role in the 
creation of exhaustion. Bobbs-Merrill might not have made the connec-
tion explicit, but when read together with other contemporaneous deci-
sions, the link between the emergence of exhaustion and those common 
law principles becomes apparent. In this short Essay we cannot explore 
every contemporaneous opinion that explicitly or implicitly used com-
 
9 Id. (quoting Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 536 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).  
10 Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797) (noting that an act “in derogation of 
the common law is to be taken strictly”); Theodore Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Con-
struction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 267 (2d ed. 1874) (“[S]tatutes are not to be 
presumed to alter the common law farther than they expressly declare . . . .”). That treatise 
was broadly used by courts, including the Supreme Court, including at the time in which the 
principles of exhaustion were developed. See, e.g., Ca. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction 
Works, 199 U.S. 306, 324 (1905). 
11 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 318 
(2012) (“[S]tatutes will not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they effect the 
change with clarity.”).  
12 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
13 Id. at 339–40. 
14 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First 
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 487, 493–94 (2011); Christina 
Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 251 
(2013); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 
90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1211, 1249–52 (2015); John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking 
First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 12–13 (2004); 
Rub, supra note 2, at 759–62; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. 
L.J. 885, 910–14 (2008).  
15 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 8. 
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mon law principles in constructing exhaustion, but in the next few para-
graphs we would like to point to a few of them.16 
Consider, for example, Doan v. American Book Co.,17 one of the dec-
ades-long line of copyright exhaustion cases that culminated in Bobbs-
Merrill. In that decision the Seventh Circuit held that a purchaser of a 
book could repair and restore it notwithstanding the copyright holder’s 
objections. The decision was not rooted in any statutory text, but in the 
intrinsic nature of personal property rights, as the court explained: “It 
would be intolerable and odious” to deny that a “right of ownership in 
the book carries with it and includes the right to maintain” it.18 
To take another example, the same year the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided Bobbs-Merrill, the Australian High Court interpreted the term 
“vend” in that country’s patent statute.19 The High Court, in light of “the 
recognized rule that the legislature is not to be taken to have made a 
change in the fundamental principles of the common law without ex-
press and clear words announcing such an intention,” concluded that the 
right to vend did “not refer to any sale of the article after it has once, 
without violation of the monopoly, became part of the common stock.”20 
On appeal the Privy Council reversed, focusing on the need to reconcile 
the apparent inconsistency between the common law principles and the 
patent statute. The U.S. Supreme Court would rely on this judgment a 
year later in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,21 and courts continue to cite it, in-
cluding the Federal Circuit in an important 2016 patent exhaustion deci-
sion.22 
This brings us to the early twentieth century Supreme Court patent 
exhaustion case law. In 1912, in Henry, the Court held that patentees 
could impose restraints on downstream purchasers and that “[t]here is no 
 
16 See also Samuel F. Ernst, Why Patent Exhaustion Should Liberate Products (And Not 
Just People), Denver L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at *21–*27) (on file with au-
thors) (noting the role of the policy against servitudes on chattels in early patent exhaustion 
cases, as well as the impact of the single recovery and statutory domain theories). 
17 105 F. 772 (7th Cir. 1901). 
18 Id. at 777.  
19 See, e.g., Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Menck (1908) 7 CLR 481 (Austl.), 
rev’d in part Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Menck (1911) 12 CLR 15, 24 (Austl.) 
(holding that “the general doctrine of absolute freedom of disposal” can be restricted in the 
case of patented goods). 
20 Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. Ltd. v. Menck (1908) 7 CLR 481, 512 (Austl.). 
21 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
22 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., Nos. 2014–1617, 2014–1619, 2016 WL 
559042 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2016) (en banc). 
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collision between the rule against restrictions upon the alienation or use 
of chattels not made under the protection of a patent and the right of the 
patentee through his control over his invention.”23 Duffy and Hynes de-
scribe the disagreement between the majority and dissent in Henry as 
“primarily about the scope or domain of the patent statute, not about 
common law policies.”24 But, read in context, it is clear that the common 
law baseline, and whether Congress intended to deviate from it, was one 
of the key points of contention in a rather bitter division among the Jus-
tices. 
Both the majority and the dissent in this long decision relied heavily 
not just on the statutory language and existing precedent, but also on 
general legal principles and on the need to promote public policy goals. 
Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice White raised concerns regarding 
the expansive reading of patentees’ rights. His views were partly rooted 
in the common law. For example, he noted that the various forms in 
which patentees purported to extend their control “tend to increase mo-
nopoly and to burden the public to the exercise of their common 
rights.”25 In another place, the dissent chastised the majority for not ap-
plying the rule that the Court had set forth a year earlier in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.26 In that decision the Court—
relying explicitly and extensively on the common law aversion to re-
straints of trade—held that downstream control of nonpatented goods, in 
the form of a retail price maintenance scheme, was invalid.27 
Chief Justice White’s dissenting views prevailed five years later when 
the Court explicitly reversed Henry.28 The same day, in Straus v. Victor 
Talking Machine Co., another patent exhaustion case, the Court offered 
its most explicit early reference to the common law, stating that 
“[c]ourts would be perversely blind” if they failed to recognize restric-
 
23 Henry, 224 U.S. at 39. 
24 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 23. 
25 Henry, 224 U.S at 70 (White, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The term “common 
rights” is synonymous with “common law rights.” See, e.g., Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 
Pet.) 410, 437 (1838) (“[The right] exists by a common right, which means a right by com-
mon law . . . .”). 
26 220 U.S. 373 (1911), cited in Henry, 224 U.S. at 54–55 (White, C.J., dissenting).  
27 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404 (citing the common law and holding that “a general restraint 
upon alienation is ordinarily invalid. ‘The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents 
of a right of general property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally 
regarded as obnoxious to public policy.’” (quoting Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 
39 (6th Cir. 1907)).  
28 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). 
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tive patent licenses as an attempt “to sell property for a full price, and 
yet to place restraints upon its further alienation, such as have been hate-
ful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours, because obnoxious to the 
public interest.”29 Lord Coke is, of course, Edward Coke, one of the 
greatest common law jurists, whose opposition to restraints on trade in-
fluences exhaustion case law to this day. 
A much more recent exhaustion case reinforces the point that even 
when the Court is undeniably engaged in statutory interpretation, the 
common law has informed its reasoning. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc.,30 the question was whether the first sale doctrine embraced 
the importation and resale of books manufactured and lawfully sold 
abroad. Specifically, the case turned on the meaning of the phrase “law-
fully made under this title.”31 Despite the clearly statutory nature of the 
question, the majority described the first sale doctrine as one “with an 
impeccable historic pedigree” dating back to “the early 17th century.”32 
The Court relied on the fact that “[t]he common-law doctrine makes no 
geographical distinctions” to bolster its statutory reading.33 And it em-
phasized the policy considerations disfavoring “restraints on the aliena-
tion of chattels” and embracing the “importance of leaving buyers of 
goods free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise dis-
posing of those goods.”34 Those considerations, along with “§ 109(a)’s 
language, its context, and the common-law history of the ‘first sale’ doc-
trine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation.”35 The 
Court thus had no trouble reconciling the common law with statutory in-
terpretation. 
The Court’s approach in Kirtsaeng thus strongly reinforces our views 
and the consensus among scholars that the common law played a role in 
the development of exhaustion and thus challenges Duffy and Hynes’s 
rejection of that consensus. In discussing Kirtsaeng, Duffy and Hynes 
are forced to concede that the court was invoking a “‘canon of statutory 
interpretation’ disfavoring expansive readings of statutes that ‘invade the 
common law.’”36 We are, however, unsure how that acknowledgement 
 
29 243 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1917) (emphasis added). 
30 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
31 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
32 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1358 (emphasis omitted). 
36 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 51 (quoting Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363). 
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squares with their overall rejection of the consensus approach. In other 
words, we are puzzled by Duffy and Hynes’s failure to consider that 
other decisions, including those that established the core of IP exhaus-
tion doctrine, were similarly relying on this centuries-old canon of inter-
pretation.37 
Duffy and Hynes make another claim to support their account of the 
emergence of exhaustion. They note that a number of early exhaustion 
decisions “disclaim any attempt to adjudicate the relief plaintiffs might 
obtain outside of IP law”38 and argue that “[s]uch agnosticism about ul-
timate results would be difficult to explain if the Court were engaged in 
pure policymaking directed toward substantive goals.”39 For example, in 
Bobbs-Merrill, the Court noted there was no contract claim before it.40 
Similarly, in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufactur-
ing Co., the Court noted that whether the patentee can restrict the buyer 
“by special contract between the owner of the patent and a purchaser or 
licensee is a question outside the patent law and with it we are not here 
concerned.”41  
We are unpersuaded that the courts were agnostic to the consequences 
or substance of post-sale restraints, and that their only concern was en-
suring the correct legal form and forum for implementing them. We dis-
agree with Duffy and Hynes for two reasons. First, reading the Court’s 
unsurprising failure to decide an issue that was not properly before it as 
a disavowal of the common law and other policy considerations is a leap 
we are unwilling to take. Second, a close examination of contemporane-
ous decisions reveals statements that are inconsistent with the agnosti-
cism hypothesis. Rather than conveying agnosticism, those courts ob-
jected to certain contracts on substantive policy grounds and expressed 
skepticism as to their enforcement as a matter of general commercial 
law. For example, Chief Justice White, in his dissent in Henry, recog-
 
37 See supra note 13.  
38 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 8.  
39 Id. at 12.  
40 Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 346.  
41 243 U.S. 502, 509 (1917). It should be noted that later in the opinion the Court ex-
pressed deep concerns with legal mechanisms that allow patentees to exercise control over 
downstream usage, stating that “[t]he perfect instrument of favoritism and oppression which 
such a system of doing business, if valid, would put into the control of the owner of such a 
patent should make courts astute, if need be, to defeat its operation.” Id. at 515 (emphasis 
added). While the Court does not explicitly state that its concerns extend beyond a patent 
cause of action, we believe that if the Court were truly agnostic with respect to enforcing 
post-sale restrictions through contract law, it would not have used such strong language.  
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nized that the validity of contractual post-sale restrictions ought to be 
governed by contract law. However, he noted that if not for the majority 
opinion, those contracts would be void as against public policy, asking 
rhetorically: “Who . . . can put a limit upon the extent of monopoly and 
wrongful restriction which will arise, especially if by such a power a 
contract which otherwise would be void as against public policy may be 
successfully maintained?”42 That majority opinion was, as we already 
noted, short lived. 
In Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., Chief Jus-
tice White, now writing for the majority, continued to express skepti-
cism as to whether post-sale restrictions are enforceable under “general 
law.”43 He explored the Court’s recent case law and concluded that 
[a]pplying the cases thus reviewed there can be no doubt that the al-
leged price-fixing contract disclosed in the certificate was contrary to 
the general law and void. There can be equally no doubt that the pow-
er to make it in derogation of the general law was not within the mo-
nopoly conferred by the patent law . . . .44  
This statement, we believe, plainly indicates that the Court was not ag-
nostic to the possibility of enforcing post-sale restrictions via contracts, 
as it perceived the contracts at issue as void under general law. Moreo-
ver, in relying on its recent case law—which included numerous IP ex-
haustion cases as well as Dr. Miles, which deals with nonpatented prod-
ucts—to reach this result, the Court indicated that it did not consider the 
rights under IP law and the rights under general law as completely sepa-
rated, as Duffy and Hynes argue,45 but as highly related.46 As we further 
discuss below, the interaction between these two bodies of law is indeed 
complex. 
In short, the arguments raised by Duffy and Hynes do not convince us 
that courts ignored well-established common law principles while de-
veloping exhaustion. We remain persuaded that the history of exhaustion 
 
42 Henry, 224 U.S at 70–71 (emphasis added).  
43 246 U.S. 8, 20 (1918).  
44 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
45 Cf. Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that the Boston Store Court “distin-
guishes between issues within the patent domain from those governed by “the general law ); 
id. at 28 (“[I]n creating the exhaustion doctrine, the Supreme Court did sharply distinguish 
statutory issues under federal IP laws from common law issues concerning contract and 
property.”).  
46 See also Boston Store, 246 U.S. at 20–21, 27. 
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shows that those principles played—and continue to play—a role in 
shaping the doctrine. Likewise, we reject their assertion that the courts 
showed no interest in public policy and specifically that the courts’ con-
cern about post-sale restraints had nothing to do with the substance of 
those restraints. 
II. THE NORMATIVE IMPACT OF STATUTORY DOMAIN 
Duffy and Hynes view exhaustion as exclusively a matter of statutory 
domain. That claim plays a dual role in their analysis. First, it contrasts 
their theory with what they describe as the prevailing wisdom about ex-
haustion’s relationship to other areas of law. But as we will describe, in 
drawing that distinction, Duffy and Hynes mischaracterize much of the 
prior exhaustion scholarship. Second, it restricts the ability of courts to 
consider broader policy goals, reducing the judicial function to identify-
ing largely arbitrary triggers for exhaustion and stripping the doctrine of 
much of its normative content. 
The consensus view among modern commentators, Duffy and Hynes 
suggest, leads to IP doctrine running roughshod over distinct bodies of 
law like contract and property. Exhaustion, they argue, is required to 
preserve these other areas of law undisturbed. Modern commentators, 
they say, hold very different beliefs. Skeptics of exhaustion want “com-
plete freedom to contract around exhaustion.”47 And exhaustion propo-
nents see the doctrine as a “free ranging power”48 to “allow or forbid a 
particular transaction.”49 Many scholars, they tell us, “want the courts to 
forbid any circumvention[s]” of exhaustion.50 Later, they claim that 
many of those same scholars view leases as “unjustified circumventions 
of the exhaustion doctrine.”51 But they fail to cite any scholars who ac-
tually espouse these categorical views. 
We do not think this characterization reflects the majority of scholar-
ship on exhaustion. It certainly does not reflect our views. We believe 
that even if exhaustion applies, a valid agreement may often give rise to 
a claim of breach and contractual remedies.52 Similarly, we believe that 
 
47 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 10. 
48 Id. at 28. 
49 Id. at 9. 
50 Id. at 10. 
51 Id. at 54. 
52 See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 904–05, Rub, supra note 2, at 809–12. 
See also Ariel Katz, The Economic Rationale of Exhaustion: Distribution and Post-Sale Re-
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exhaustion does not forbid rights holders from offering products through 
genuine leases, rentals, or subscriptions.53 Of course, not all attempts at 
licensing or contracting around exhaustion will succeed. In some in-
stances they might be preempted or invalid for violating public policy, a 
decision that might be partly guided by some of the same policies that 
informed the development of exhaustion. But it is not our position, nor, 
we believe, the position of most modern commentators, that exhaustion 
necessarily or routinely undermines general commercial law. The con-
tention that contract and property law can coexist with exhaustion is en-
tirely consistent with the prevailing wisdom. 
That is not to say that the argument put forward by Duffy and Hynes 
is without consequences. If courts adopt the view advocated by Duffy 
and Hynes, it would significantly limit the tools at their disposal for re-
solving pressing questions about the scope of exhaustion. Duffy and 
Hynes claim that exhaustion draws a formal line between what is regu-
lated by IP law and what is not. As they admit, “formalist boundary lines 
are inherently arbitrary.”54 As a result, their theory urges courts to ignore 
the impact of exhaustion on other policy goals. We find this outcome in-
consistent with well-established practices, difficult to sustain, and unde-
sirable. 
Consider, for example, two contemporary exhaustion questions: the 
choice between international and national exhaustion and the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine to digital distribution. As a matter of copyright law, 
the Supreme Court resolved the first of these questions when it adopted 
international exhaustion in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Re-
search International, Inc.55 and Kirtsaeng.56 Most commentators agree 
that the text of the Copyright Act provides plausible arguments both for 
and against international exhaustion. The Court’s choice between them 
 
straints, in Research Handbook on IP Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Irene Calboli & Ed-
ward Lee eds., Edward Elgar 2016) (suggesting that the common law doctrine of restraint of 
trade could evolve to distinguish between valid and invalid contracting around exhaustion); 
Katz, supra note 2, at 90–100 (proposing some parameters to distinguish between valid and 
invalid instances of contracting around exhaustion).  
53 See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 2, at 904 (“Copyright owners committed to 
price discrimination can avoid [exhaustion] by structuring transactions not as sales but as 
leases or subscription services.”). This does not mean, however, that right holders should be 
able to avoid exhaustion by merely labeling a sale or other transfer of ownership a “license.” 
Rub, supra note 2, at 814–16.  
54 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 36. 
55 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998). 
56 133 S. Ct. at 1359. 
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2016] Exhaustion and General Law 19 
was not limited to a narrow examination of the Act; it also considered 
broader policy questions, including access to creative works,57 “com-
petition, including freedom to resell,”58 judicial administrability,59 and 
“basic constitutional copyright objectives.”60 
The Federal Circuit recently provided a different answer to that ques-
tion when it affirmed national patent exhaustion in Lexmark Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc.61 Granted, both the majority and 
the dissent partly based their decisions on the language and the structure 
of the Patent Act, as compared to Kirtsaeng’s interpretation of the Copy-
right Act. However, both the majority and the dissent extensively ad-
dressed policy concerns. They analyzed how national and international 
exhaustion would affect certainty in the market, allow patentees to re-
coup their investments through price discrimination, might foster per-
petual control over downstream distribution, and more.62 Therefore, the 
Lexmark majority and dissent, like the Kirtsaeng majority and dissent, 
agree with the scholarly consensus that policy considerations play a vital 
role in interpreting and shaping exhaustion. 
Digital distribution provides another example of the difficulty in un-
derstanding exhaustion as an “inherently arbitrary” line between IP law 
and general law, as Duffy and Hynes maintain,63 because this view lim-
its the ability of courts to adjust the scope of exhaustion over time and in 
response to changing conditions. The primary reason for the recent at-
 
57 Quality King, 523 U.S. at 151 (noting, for example, that the plaintiff’s position in that 
case, promoting national exhaustion, “would merely inhibit access to ideas without any 
countervailing benefit”).  
58 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363. 
59 Id. (noting the “burden of trying to enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily 
movable goods”).  
60 Id. at 1364–65 (noting the impact of national exhaustion on libraries and museums). 
61 Nos. 2014–1617, 2014–1619, 2016 WL 559042 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2016) (en banc). 
62 See, e.g., id. at *18–19 (discussing how patents provide “market-based reward” to the 
patentee and the problem of vagueness); id. at *25 (discussing the need to “incentivize crea-
tion and disclosure”); id. at *26 (discussing the social benefits from patentee’s ability to of-
fer a menu of products); id. at *33–34 (discussing the practical effects of national exhaustion 
on the market and noting that “there is no concomitant risk of ‘perpetual downstream con-
trol’”); id. at *34–36 (discussing how exhaustion affects the patentees’ markets, income, and 
costs); id. at *44–45 (comparing certain aspects of the markets for copyrighted and patented 
goods and analyzing the impact of exhaustion regimes on those markets); id. at *58–59 (dis-
cussing the importance of allowing purchasers to compete, the effects of exhaustion on ad-
ministrative costs, the need to allow free trade in goods embodying patented inventions, the 
impact on transaction costs and prices, and the role of international trade).  
63 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 36. 
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tention exhaustion has received is that modern markets are increasingly 
global and digital. As a result, those markets prompt questions about the 
ideal scope of IP rights and their exhaustion. The ability to apply long-
standing IP doctrines to new technologies and market realities—as 
courts have done in various contexts64—depends on the recognition of 
broader principles. Those principles cannot flout statutory directives, of 
course, but they should not be ignored altogether either, when statutes 
lend themselves to more than one plausible meaning.65 
Admittedly, Duffy and Hynes might see the elimination of the policy 
considerations as a feature, not a bug. If technological or market condi-
tions alter the policy implications of exhaustion, they might argue that it 
is the task of Congress to weigh those concerns and enact a new statute. 
We agree that Congress could act, as it, from time to time, has acted.66 
And once Congress acts, courts would be bound to interpret the statute 
as faithfully as they can. But IP law regulates a fast moving technologi-
cal world, and historically it has been the role of courts to help keep IP 
law up to speed. Moreover, when it comes to exhaustion, Congress has 
repeatedly signaled its acceptance of the judicial role in defining the 
broad contours of the doctrine.67 
The theory offered by Duffy and Hynes has two primary normative 
implications. The first—that their theory avoids the trampling of com-
mercial law by IP law—rests on a false premise. The bulk of the cases 
and commentary reveal that the IP-domination Duffy and Hynes fear is 
more specter than reality. The second implication—that courts should 
ignore policy considerations in favor of focusing solely on the statutory 
text—unnecessarily ties the hands of courts applying the exhaustion 
doctrine, even when no conflict between IP and commercial law is at 
 
64 There are numerous decisions that demonstrate this phenomenon. See, e.g., Am. Broad. 
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (applying public performance policy to 
online streaming); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2014) (ap-
plying fair use to a mass digitalization project); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com., 508 F.3d 
1146, 1155–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying fair use to an online search engine).  
65 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“When technologi-
cal change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in 
light of this basic purpose.”). 
66 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237.  
67 In 1909, Congress had “no intention [of] enlarg[ing] in any way the construction to be 
given to the word ‘vend.’” H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 19 (1909). In 1976, Congress affirmed 
its intent to “restate[ ] and confirm[ ]” the first sale rule “established by the court decisions.” 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693.  
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stake. Below, we explore a final question left unresolved by Duffy and 
Hynes’s discussion on the interaction between exhaustion and commer-
cial law—the role of preemption. 
III. EXHAUSTION AND STATE LAW: THE PREEMPTION PROBLEM 
Duffy and Hynes claim that non-IP law was and should be taken into 
account in developing and applying exhaustion. We agree. In fact, when 
courts utilized the common law to develop exhaustion, they did just that. 
When Bobbs-Merrill was decided, more than forty years before the Uni-
form Commercial Code was created, commercial law was, in large part, 
the common law. From that perspective, the stark dichotomy Duffy and 
Hynes describe between “general commercial law,” which exhaustion 
was designed to preserve, and “the common law,” which was allegedly 
irrelevant, is more of a porous membrane. We also agree with Duffy and 
Hynes that non-IP laws have a role to play even when exhaustion limits 
the rights of copyright owners and patentees. That role should be con-
sidered when developing IP policy.68 
Duffy and Hynes explore the interaction between exhaustion and oth-
er areas of commercial law that regulate secondary markets. This in-
depth analysis can lead to important normative insights regarding the de-
sirable scope of IP rights. It is indeed vital that IP commentators 
acknowledge the role of general commercial laws within IP policy. The 
contribution of Duffy and Hynes will surely advance that discussion. We 
want, however, to make two comments on the interaction between IP 
law and general commercial law. 
First, this interaction is not limited to exhaustion. IP laws incorpo-
rate—but do not define—basic commercial terms, such as sale, license, 
assignment, or mortgage.69 Federal IP laws rely on state law definitions 
of those terms.70 This symbiosis between federal IP law and general 
commercial law cuts across many IP doctrines. Because each of those 
doctrines must be developed in tandem with state commercial law, it is 
 
68 Many have discussed the role of non-IP laws, as well as non-legal tools, in developing 
IP policy. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law 23 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Eco-
nomic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 464 (1998); Trotter Har-
dy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217, 223–24.  
69 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
70 David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 17, 
24–29 (1999). 
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hard to see why exhaustion should be singled out as a unique doctrine 
that is meant to preserve general commercial law, as Duffy and Hynes 
suggest. In some respects, this makes their analysis of the role of state 
law in regulating secondary markets even more valuable. It could serve 
as a model to explore similar interactions with other IP law doctrines. 
Second, considering the interaction between federal IP law and state 
law requires a careful analysis of federal preemption, and in particular 
copyright preemption. Copyright preemption is a thorn in the side of the 
Duffy and Hynes theory. Exhaustion cannot be a doctrine that is purely 
designed to preserve other laws, such as contract and private property, if 
it might also preempt some of those other arrangements. However, fed-
eral IP law does not give state commercial law unlimited power to regu-
late secondary markets. While state law does generally regulate those 
markets,71 the power of states to create certain legal regimes—for exam-
ple, one that grants copyright owners a copyright-like exclusive right 
over the resale of copyrighted works—is limited by federal preemption 
law. 
Duffy and Hynes make two arguments to prevent preemption from 
casting a shadow over their theory. First, they suggest that because ex-
haustion limits the scope of the exclusive rights under federal law, then 
rights created under state law to circumvent exhaustion are, by defini-
tion, not equivalent to rights under the Copyright Act, as required by 
§ 301(a), its explicit preemption provision.72 Second, they argue that 
“broad preemption arguments have had very little success in the 
courts”73 following the Seventh Circuit decision in ProCD v. Zei-
denberg.74 
We find both arguments problematic. The main difficulty with their 
first argument is that it ignores the purpose and uniform interpretation of 
§ 301(a). Limiting the scope of copyright preemption to the scope of the 
exclusive rights, as suggested by Duffy and Hynes, will allow states to 
interfere with federal policy in a way that is inconsistent with the pur-
 
71 And, in doing so, they take into account some of the policy considerations that are also 
reflected in exhaustion doctrine. For example, the Restatement of Contracts suggests that a 
contractual promise is unenforceable as a matter of state law “on grounds of public policy if 
it is unreasonably in restraint of trade,” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 186 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1981), a policy that, as we have seen, played a role in the development of exhaustion as 
well. 
72 Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 73–74. 
73 Id. at 74. 
74 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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pose of the Act. For example, such an approach would give states carte 
blanche to regulate ideas, methods, and fair uses. This approach has 
been consistently rejected by courts. In fact, the Seventh Circuit rejected 
it in ProCD, stating that  
[o]ne function of § 301(a) is to prevent states from giving special pro-
tection to works of authorship that Congress has decided should be in 
the public domain, which it can accomplish only if “subject matter of 
copyright” includes all works of a type covered by sections 102 and 
103, even if federal law does not afford protection to them.75  
The Sixth Circuit has similarly stated that “the shadow actually cast by 
the [Copyright] Act’s preemption is notably broader than the wing of its 
protection.”76  
The second argument, which relies on ProCD, faces two weaknesses. 
First, while ProCD was adopted by several federal circuit courts, it is 
not the law of the land.77 The Second Circuit, for example, refused to 
endorse it,78 and the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected it.79 Second, and 
more important, the argument that Duffy and Hynes make is significant-
ly broader than the Seventh Circuit’s approach in ProCD. ProCD and its 
progeny deal exclusively with contractual rights. In fact, the distinction 
between property rights and contractual rights is the main rationale for 
those decisions.80 Therefore, ProCD does not support the proposition 
that states are free to create any property-like arrangement they please 
with respect to information goods. 
Again, our claim is not that IP law and policy necessarily trump any 
or even most state law claims and doctrines. We, however, maintain that 
courts do not and should not be categorically denied the opportunity to 
 
75 Id. at 1453.  
76 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 454 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United 
States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997)).  
77 See Guy A. Rub, Contracting Around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of 
Rights in Creative Works, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 257, 258 (2011). 
78 Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television, 683 F.3d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In this 
case, we need not address whether preemption is precluded whenever there is a contract 
claim . . . .”).  
79 Wrench, 256 F.3d at 457–58 (“[W]e do not embrace the proposition that all state law 
contract claims survive preemption . . . .”).  
80 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (explaining that “rights created by contract” are not “equivalent 
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright” because “[a] copyright 
is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; 
strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’”). 
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consider IP policy and preemption when a dispute touches on areas that 
are regulated by commercial law, including secondary markets. While 
commercial law should undoubtedly help shape IP law, preemption doc-
trine makes the relationship between exhaustion and other areas of the 
law more complex than Duffy and Hynes suggest. 
CONCLUSION 
The three of us do not always agree on the socially desirable scope of 
IP exhaustion. However, we do agree on the ways in which that scope 
should ideally be set. It should explore the justifications for exhaustion, 
examine how strong and applicable they are nowadays and going for-
ward, study the effects it has on initial and secondary markets for copy-
righted goods, and yes—consider other legal (as well as non-legal) ways 
to regulate those markets. The various competing interests and consider-
ations should continue to inform the evolution of the law. Duffy and 
Hynes focus on one of these considerations, the role of general commer-
cial law, and provide important insights about it. But focusing exclusive-
ly on that single consideration significantly narrows the perspective of 
what exhaustion is and what it should be. We find such an approach nei-
ther consistent with a century and a half of existing law nor advisable. 
 
